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Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency 
Abstract 
Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgement. The Trolley Problem is a 
familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the Trolley 
Problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, it is assumed 
that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. 
This in turn is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation 
externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the 
assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgement in psychopathy. Next, we 
consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the 
capacity for moral judgement is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the 
psǇĐhopathiĐ suďjeĐt͛s inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in 
response to Trolley Pƌoďleŵs doesŶ͛t tell us ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh aďout the psǇĐhopathiĐ suďjeĐt͛s capacity to make 
moral judgements, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding 
that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy.  
 
 
Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency 
 
I. Introduction 
In philosophical debates about the nature of moral judgement, the case of psychopathy is often used to test 
various claims. For instance, it has been used to attack motivation internalism, as well as certain versions of 
moral rationalism. Claims made about moral judgement in psychopathy are based on empirical tests, which 
usually consist of questionnaires that feature hypothetical scenarios involving a conflict between two moral 
imperatives.
1
 A commonly used scenario in philosophical discussions features the so-called Trolley Problem. 
Where a convergence in response to a hypothetical dilemma is registered between psychopathic subjects and 
non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, this convergence is generally taken to indicate that the capacity for 
making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. From this, the motivation externalist, for instance, 
draws the conclusion that the amoral behaviour observed in psychopathy shows that moral judgement and 
the motivation to act are merely contingently related. [12] 
The ascription of the capacity for moral understanding to psychopathic subjects on the basis of convergence in 
response hypothetical dilemmas (such as to Trolley Problems) assumes that such convergence is indeed 
revelatory of this capacity. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question this 
assumption. Next, we turn to consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong 
grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgement is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. Our 
central claim will be this: although convergence in response to Trolley Pƌoďleŵs doesŶ͛t tell us ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh 
about the psychopathiĐ suďjeĐt͛s capacity to make moral judgements, there is something distinctive about 
psychopathic behaviour which does shed light on this capacity. The feature in question is the psychopathic 
suďjeĐt͛s inability to make sincere apologies.  
This aspect of moral cognition has so far received little attention in the literature, but it seems to us to be 
essential in determining whether or not a person is capable of forming and retaining moral beliefs. The 
practice of apology-making is an important feature of our moral lives, and we intuitively take it as a measure of 
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 This experimental paradigm was originally articulated by Lawrence Kohlberg, in the context of studying the 
ontogenetic development of socialization and the capacity for moral judgement. [3] More recently, philosophers 
and cognitive scientists have placed the Trolley Problem within this experimental paradigm to explore the 
patterns of judgement made by competent adult subjects.  A pioneering paper in this more recent exploration is 
Greene et al 2001. [5] 
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a peƌsoŶ͛s ŵoƌal awareness.2 The psǇĐhopathiĐ suďjeĐt͛s inability to make sincere apologies invites us to look 
more closely at the pre-theoretical importance that we place on the practice of apology-making in determining 
a peƌsoŶ͛s Đapacity for moral judgement. In Section III of this paper, we will try to explicitly connect apology-
making with moral understanding. We think that the importance that we ordinarily place on the ability to 
make apologies in determining a person͛s ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ ŵoƌal uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg will be shown to be warranted. 
This shows therefore that the psǇĐhopathiĐ suďjeĐt͛s capacity for moral understanding is seriously impaired. 
 
II. Trolleyology: what does the convergence in judgement tell us? 
The Trolley Problem comes in two key variants, one which requires the agent to inflict so-Đalled ͚peƌsoŶal 
haƌŵ͛ aŶd the otheƌ ǁhiĐh ƌeƋuiƌes the ageŶt to iŶfliĐt ͚iŵpeƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛. The two scenarios are summarised 
in Greene et al 2001 as follows:  
A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The 
only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where 
it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the 
expense of one? Most people say yes. Now consider a similar problem, the footbridge dilemma. As 
before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge 
that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the only 
way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if 
you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five 
others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no. [5]
3
 
Because the second scenario described requires the agent to come into direct physical contact the victim, the 
agent is described as inflicting ͚personal͛ harm on the victim. The first scenario does not require any direct 
physical contact between agent and victim, and so is described as a case of ͚impersonal͛ harm.  
A recent paper reports that psychopathic and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects respond in similar ways to 
the two variants of the Trolley Problem just sketched: like most subjects in the normal population, subjects in 
the psychopathic population tend to judge that we should hit the switch in the first scenario but not push the 




 A convergence in judgement between psychopathic subjects and non-
psychopathic (normal) subjects—in the Trolley scenarios as well as other types of scenario—is generally taken 
to indicate that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. On the basis of this 
observed convergence, various substantive conclusions have been drawn about the nature of moral 
judgement, e.g. that emotional processes are not causally necessary for moral judgement [2], or that the 
motivation to act is merely contingently related to moral judgement (since psychopathic subjects display 
amoral behaviour). [12]  
These conclusions rest on one important assumption: that convergence between the normal (non-
psychopathic) population and the psychopathic population provides us with sufficient grounds for ascribing to 
the psychopathic subject the capacity to make moral judgements. This in turn presumes that the judgements 
made by the majority of subjects in the normal population are the morally right ones to make. In other words, 
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 That we do this is most clearly exemplified by judicial remarks. In delivering their judgements, it is not 
uncommon for judges to remark on the absence of remorse shown by the defendant, in cases where the 
defendant has shown no remorse throughout the trial.  
3
 Note that Greene et al 2001 don‟t touch on the subject of psychopathy; they are interested in explaining the 
difference in judgement that ordinary subjects give across the two scenarios.  
4
 This is the latest finding in a fairly long history of findings that report a similarity in patterns of moral 
judgement between psychopathic and non-psychopathic populations, although note that earlier studies did not 
use the Trolley Problem (see e.g. [1],[8], [14]).  
5
 It should be noted, however, that contrary findings were reported in slightly earlier studies, i.e. in contrast with 
the majority of subjects in the normal population, psychopathic subjects tended to judge both that the switch 





it presumes that the majority of subjects in the normal population are, by and large, successful at tracking 
moral norms. This assumption is questionable, at least with respect to the trolley problems. Quite 
independently of the merits of consequentialist views of morals, the inconsistency in judgement that normal 
subjects make—ďetǁeeŶ the ͚peƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛ Đase aŶd the ͚iŵpeƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛ Đase—should be a cause for 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶ. WhǇ should pushiŶg soŵeoŶe diƌeĐtlǇ iŶto haƌŵ͛s ǁaǇ, as opposed to hittiŶg a sǁitĐh that ǁill 
certainly run him over, be a morally significant difference? There may be psychologically significant 
differences, but unless we are prepared to identify these psychologically significant differences as morally 
significant ones, the inconsistency seems puzzling — and it seems to suggest that most normal subjects do not 
always make the best moral decisions.  
Pertinent to the present point is that most, but not all, subjects in the normal population manifest this 
inconsistency in responding to the two trolley problems. A minority of subjects in this population do in fact 
judge that the trolley should be stopped from killing the five people in both cases, i.e. regardless of whether 
doing so involves personally or impersonally harming another person. A consequentialist would argue that this 
is the morally right decision to make. In this vein, Peter Singer argues as follows: 
In some people, reasoning can overcome an initial emotionally based response. ...The answer that 
these [minority] subjects gave is, surely, the answer that a rational being would give. We ought to 
minimize the loss of innocent life, unless there is some valid reason against doing so. [13:196-7] 
The fact that we happen to be biologically programmed to respond emotionally aversely to pushing a person, 
but not to hitting a switch that will ultimately cause the same person to be killed, is not, for Singer, a morally 
salient fact - even if it is a psychologically interesting fact. So pushing someone directly onto the path of the 
trolley does not, for Singer, constitute a valid reason against minimizing the loss of innocent life in the 
͚peƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛ ǀeƌsioŶ of the tƌolleǇ sĐeŶaƌio.  
Singer puts his point in terms of emotional responses and moral reasoning, which might look problematic in 
light of the findings reported in Cima et al, 2010. [2] Recall that, according to this study, psychopathic and the 
majority of normal subjects converge in their judgements in the two versions of the trolley problem. The 
authors conclude on the basis of this convergence that these judgements cannot consist in, or be caused by, 
emotional responses since psychopathic subjects haǀe defiĐits iŶ eŵotioŶal pƌoĐessiŶg. “o “iŶgeƌ͛s diǀisioŶ 
between emotional responses and moral reasoning to account for different patterns of judgement in the 
normal population (majority vs. minority) might seem to be erroneous for empirical reasons. But there is a 
deeper point that Singer is making, that is not hostage to the empirical question of whether the majority of 
suďjeĐts iŶ the Ŷoƌŵal populatioŶ aƌe ƌespoŶdiŶg ŵeƌelǇ eŵotioŶallǇ oƌ otheƌǁise iŶ the ͚peƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛ 
variant of the trolley problem. To ďƌiŶg out the deepeƌ poiŶt, ǁe͛ll laďel the ƌespoŶse to the ͚peƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛ 
variant—given by both the psychopathic population and the majority of subjects in the normal population—
the ͞X ƌespoŶse͟. Noǁ “iŶgeƌ͛s poiŶt is that ďǇ the ĐoŶseƋueŶtialist͛s lights, the X ƌespoŶse is ŵoƌallǇ ǁƌoŶg 
even if the majority of subjects in the normal population manifest this response. There is a conceptual gap 
between the moral judgements that people do in fact make (in this case, the X response) and the judgements 
they ought to make, as determined by a normative ethical theory. Therefore, even if psychopathic subjects 
converge in their judgements with the majority of the normal population, this does not yet show that they are 
capable of making moral judgements. It may just show that a large number of subjects in the normal 
populatioŶ aƌeŶ͛t ǀeƌǇ good at making moral judgements.  
AgaiŶst this, it ŵaǇ ďe said that the oƌdiŶaƌǇ suďjeĐt͛s ŵoƌal uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg—i.e. a subject who belongs to the 
majority subset in the normal population—is a good enough understanding, and that we cannot expect 
ordinary subjects to be perfect in their moral decision-making. The capacity for making moral judgements is 
not, nor should it be thought of as being, infallible. However, this isŶ͛t a happǇ ƌespoŶse foƌ those ǁaŶtiŶg to 
ascribe to the psychopathic subject the capacity for moral judgement—on the basis of convergence between 
the psychopathic subject and the majority of normal subjects—because it concedes that the majority of 
Ŷoƌŵal suďjeĐts ŵake the ǁƌoŶg ŵoƌal judgeŵeŶt iŶ the ͚peƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛ Đase, aŶd a convergence in an 
erroneous judgement can surely tell us nothing about the capacity to make moral judgements either in 
psychopathic or in the majority of normal subjects.  
In any case, there is a more basic diffiĐultǇ aďout ƌeasoŶiŶg fƌoŵ ĐoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe that “iŶgeƌ͛s disĐussioŶ ďƌiŶgs 
out, which is best seen in the following counterfactual case: suppose the psychopathic subject's judgement in 
the ͚peƌsoŶal haƌŵ͛ ǀaƌiaŶt of the trolley problem turned out not to resemble the judgement made by the 
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majority of normal subjects (suppose, that is, that the psychopathic subject judges that we should push the 
man over, just as we ought to hit the switch, to save five people). Then, since convergence is being offered as 
the reason for ascribing moral understanding to the psychopathic subject (importantly, as the sole reason for 
doing so), the failure of convergence should lead us to retract the ascription of moral understanding to the 
psychopathic subject. But that is precisely what we shouldn't do, according to Singer, because there is a 
conceptual gap between the X response (i.e. the response displayed by the majority of normal subjects) and 
the response that one ought to give, as determined by a normative ethical theory. This difficulty may be spelt 
out as follows:  
(I) if there is convergence, it indicates a similarity in the X response between psychopathic and the 
majority of normal subjects (and the X response is not, for normativists like Singer, the same 
thing as making a moral judgement) and  
(II) If there is a failure of convergence, it may indicate: either (i) a dissimilarity in the X response or (ii) a 
similarity in the tendency to make, or see the attraction of, the X response but the capacity on 
the part of the psychopathic subject to override that response using reason (although we cannot 
say yet whether that reason involves the exercise moral understanding. That is, we cannot say 
just yet whether the psychopathic subject is exercising moral reason specifically) 
For the normativist, it is because the X response does not necessarily constitute an exercise of moral 
judgement that nothing interesting about the psychopathic subject͛s ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ ŵoƌal judgeŵeŶt folloǁs 
from convergence (or the lack thereof). Crucially, for the normativist, a failure of convergence may in fact 
demonstrate that the psychopathic subject both shares the attraction to make the X response with most 
subjects in the normal population and is capable of making moral judgements (Option (II)(ii)). It is this 
overlooked possibility that renders any attempt to draw conclusions on the basis of convergence (or 
otherwise) invalid. The only way to block option (II)(ii) would be by identifying the X response with moral 
judgement as a matter of principle, so that a moral judgement just is whatever the X response is. This would 
render incoherent the idea that a judgement could fail to converge with the X response and nonetheless 
constitutes a successful exercise of the capacity for moral judgement. And it is only by ruling out this possibility 
that convergence—or the failure thereof—tells us anything interesting about the psychopathic subject͛s 
capacity for moral judgement. But blocking option (II)(ii) by identifying the X response with moral judgement 
as a matter of principle is a substantive commitment, and a controversial one too. Much ink has been spent 
defeŶdiŶg the Ŷoƌŵatiǀist ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of ethiĐs, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh ŵoƌal ͚oughts͛ aƌe distiŶĐt fƌoŵ faĐts aďout 
how we do in fact respond to morally charged situations. We are sympathetic to the normativist position, and 
thus we find it unattractive to identify the X response with moral judgement as a matter of principle. (For 
recent defences of the normativist position, see [9], [13]). For our present purposes, the following observation 
suffices: drawing any conclusion about the capacity for moral judgement in psychopathy from the convergence 
(or lack thereof) between psychopathic and normal subjects in response to trolley problems requires making a 
controversial assumption, namely that moral reasoning is simply a function of the patterns of judgement that 
are in fact observed in the majority of the population. If we reject this assumption, and hold instead that moral 
reasoning involǀes adheƌiŶg to ŵoƌal Ŷoƌŵs that aƌeŶ͛t siŵplǇ a fuŶĐtioŶ of the patteƌŶs of judgeŵeŶt 
displaǇed of the ŵajoƌitǇ ;iŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, if ŵoƌal Ŷoƌŵs aƌeŶ͛t just a statistiĐal ŶoƌŵͿ, theŶ ĐoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe ;oƌ 
the failure thereof) with the majority in solving trolley problems tells us ŶothiŶg aďout a peƌsoŶ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to 
make moral judgements. In other words, trolley problems tell us very little, if anything, about whether or not 
the capacity for moral judgement is impaired in psychopathy. We͛ll Ŷoǁ tuƌŶ to a distinct consideration which 
we think does show that the psychopathic subject͛s ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ ŵoƌal judgeŵeŶt is seƌiouslǇ iŵpaiƌed.  
 
III. Being apologetic: an exercise of the capacity for making moral judgements 
 
Whilst the Trolley Problem has been widely discussed in (both its own right but also) its application to 
psychopathy, there is a more direct connection between psychopathy and moral understanding which is much 
less explored. This is the connection between psychopathy, a lack of remorse, and moral understanding. 
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Psychopathy is defined in part by an inability to feel remorse and this, we think, reveals that the psychopathic 
suďjeĐt͛s capacity for moral understanding is seriously impaired.6  
The feeling of remorse is an essential part of making a sincere apology. When someone issues an apologetic 
remark without seeming remorseful, we naturally doubt that a (sincere) apology has been made. This feature 
of our everyday practice of apology making warrants the following observation: 
(A) Making an apology requires appropriate affective attunement, the most relevant affect being the 
feeling of remorse. 
We will restrict ourselves to a relatively weak reading of this claim, by granting that a subject need not 
necessarily feel remorse every single time she make a sincere apology. What is required is that the subject is 
capable of feeling remorse, and must engage this capacity on most occasions when she makes an apology. So a 
subject who utters a sentence that is conventionally used to make an apology, but who is dispositionally 
incapable of feeling remorse, does not succeed in making an apology.  
Broadly, there are two conceptions of moral understanding, a cognitivist conception and a non-cognitivist one, 
and it is a short step from (A) to the failure of moral understanding on the latter conception. The non-
cognitivist holds that moral understanding consists not in making any judgement with objective purport, but is 
rather an expression of our affective responses. Of course not all our affective responses have moral 
significance; only those that figure in the attitudes that we recognise as moral will have this significance. 
Insofar as apology-making is a morally significant practice (and it does seem to be as central to our moral lives 
as intending to act in accordance with moral principles), the affective attunement that is essential to apology-
making will consist in affective responses that have moral significance. A failure to be appropriately affectively 
attuned when an apology is called for thus arguably constitutes a failure of moral understanding, according to 
the non-cognitivist conception of moral understanding. Regardless of how moral understanding is 
articulated—whether as an error theory, projectivism or quasi-realism—it is is anchored in the feeling of 
remorse in the case of apology making. Whatever the precise role of this feeling is in the theoretical account, 
its centrality suggests a key deficit in the moral understanding of those suffering from psychopathy, according 
to the non-cognitivist picture. A lack of remorse implies an inability to make sincere apologies and hence a key 
lack in moral awareness. 
But the inability of the psychopathic subject to feel remorse and thus to make sincere apologies arguably 
implies a serious impairment in the capacity for moral understanding even according to the cognitivist 
conception of what this understanding consists in. Furthermore, the cognitivist conception underscores certain 
further features of apology making which help to illuminate the failure of moral understanding manifest in 
psychopathy. Consider, first, the fact that knowing when an apology is, or would, be called for is having the 
capacity to recognise some of the demands that are placed on moral agents by their social surroundings. 
“iŶĐeƌe apologǇ doesŶ͛t seeŵ to ďe just a matter of an affective response of the right subjective colour, as it 
were. The affective response has to be appropriately wrung from the subject by their circumstances. We may 
state put the point as follows: 
(B) Apology making essentially involves recognising, of a relevant particular situation, that an apology is 
called for or required. 
An important reason why apology making seems to involve the engagement of recognitional capacities is that 
the appropriateness conditions for the affective response wrung from the subject are considerably complex. 
To appreciate the complexity of the recognitional demands placed on an apology maker, notice that subjects 
have to distinguish between those situations which elicit empathic responses and which do call for an apology, 
from those situations in which an apology is not called for but which nonetheless do evoke an empathic 
ƌespoŶse. Let͛s ĐoŶsideƌ the folloǁiŶg sĐeŶaƌio: iŶ a fit of ƌage, Aleǆ puŶĐhes BeŶ, as a ƌesult of ǁhiĐh BeŶ͛s 
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 According to the ICD-10, one of the diagnostic conditions of dissocial personality disorder (which we 
commonly refer to as “psychopathy”) is that the subject is incapable of feeling guilt (ICD-10, p.152); and the 
upcoming DSM-5 takes a “lack of remorse after hurting or mistreating another in order” to be a diagnostic 
marker of this disorder.  




nose starts to bleed. As it happens, there happen to be two onlookers, Chris and Dan. Alex, Chris and Dan can 
all see that Ben has been physically hurt. But Dan, let us suppose, is psychopathic and so, unlike Chris and Alex, 
does not see anything more than this. Affectively, he perceives this scene no differently to a scene consisting 
of movements involving just inanimate objects (for instance, a wave crashing into a boulder on the shore). But 
intuitively, there is more to be seen. One obvious thing that is missing from Dan is an empathic response. But 
whatever a subject sees or grasps when a situation elicits an empathic response from the subject, even this 
content alone is not sufficiently discriminating to characterise what a subject recognises when he feels 
apologetic, since Chris does not feel apologetic towards Ben (nor should he feel apologetic) in spite of the fact 
that he feels eŵpathiĐallǇ foƌ BeŶ, i.e. he ͞feels BeŶ͛s paiŶ͟.7 Moral agents discriminate between (i) conditions 
that elicit an empathic response on their part but for which no apology is called for, and (ii) conditions that 
elicit an empathic response on their part and for which an apology is called for. What distinguishes Alex and 
Chris, and places Alex in the latter condition, seems to be a self-recognitional element: Alex recognises not just 
that Ben is suffering—recognising this in a way that elicits his empathy—but that something he has done has 
brought about this suffering (the point applies equally well for omissions as it does for commissions). Thus the 
recognitional coŵpoŶeŶt ;BͿ does Ŷot just depeŶd oŶ featuƌes of a ŵoƌal ageŶt͛s soĐial eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, featuƌes 
having to do with the suffering of others, but also the relevant responsibility of the agent herself. For this 
ƌeasoŶ, ǁe͛ll Đall it a dǇadiĐ tƌope.  
This example highlights the complexity of the recognitional demands that are placed on a moral agent who 
ŵakes aŶ apologǇ: the ĐoŶteŶt the ageŶt gƌasps iŶǀolǀes a ƌefleǆiǀe paiƌiŶg of ageŶt aŶd ͚oďjeĐt͛ of apologǇ. 
Because apology making involves recognising that an apology is called for (when indeed it is called for), and 
because what is recognised is something with a complex structure (i.e. the reflexive dyadic trope), apology 
ŵakiŶg thus seeŵs to eŶgage the suďjeĐt͛s ƌeĐogŶitioŶal ĐapaĐities. Foƌ this ƌeasoŶ, ǁe think that making an 
apology constitutes an exercise not just of moral understanding (as a non-cognitivist might put it) but of moral 
judgement. There is another feature of apology making reinforces this claim: apology making carries with it 
certain consequences for the subject who makes the apology. Of particular interest to our present concerns is 
the fact that the subject accrues certain obligations in virtue of making the apology (one obligation that 
frequently arises is the obligation to provide restitution to the injured party who is the target of the apology). 
A subject who frequently attempted to make apologies but was deaf to the relevance, sometimes at least, of 
restitution could not be said to have grasped the content of apology. Thus, in grasping what is owed by way of 
an apology, a sincere subject has to understand some of the consequences that are rationally connected to the 
making of the apology itself. This indicates that, in making an apology, subjects grasp a content that is 
inferentially potent.  
Humean commitments may motivate the concern that the judgement involving nature of apology summarised 
in (B) stands in conflict with (A). But to accept that they are incompatible will require providing a revisionist 
account of at least certain aspects of the practice of apology-making, since on the face of it both (A) and (B) 
hold of sincere apology. Crucially, the intuitive inseparability of feeling remorse and recognitional judgement 
suggests that claims (A) and (B) must be related non-accidentally. If the two claims were related merely 
accidentally to each other, then it would be conceptually possible to recognise that an apology is called for, 
and to exercise the recognitional capacities involved in making an apology, and yet be incapable of feeling 
remorse. But it is precisely this point that seems counterintuitive, which indicates that feeling remorse is a 
constitutive part of the exercise of the recognitional capacities involved in making an apology. In other words, 
claims (A) and (B) seem to be related to each other non-accidentally. The most obvious way to respect this 
relation is to accept that what it is to recognise that one stands in the appropriate circumstances 
(paradigmatically including responsibility for suffering) is to have the right affective response. (Equally, we 
think that no merely affect-based account can account for element of judgement. An apparently sincere 
avowal of remorse stripped of the other recognitional capacities would not count as genuinely one of 
remorse). Consider another, late, arrival to the mêlée described above: Elvis, who has kicked the fallen Ben full 
in the face. Suppose that this were an accident, the result of where Ben lay, partly hidden. Elvis may grasp 
BeŶ͛s huƌt aŶd his oǁŶ paƌtial ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ. He ŵight regret the fact that he entered the room at that 
ŵoŵeŶt. IŶ the UK, at least, he ǁould ďe likelǇ to utteƌ a ďƌisk ͞I͛ŵ so soƌƌǇ, old Đhap͟. But ǁhilst his ƌegƌet 
and sympathy might be sincere, he could feel no appropriate remorse and without a corresponding sense of 
fault, his utteƌaŶĐe Đould Ŷot ďe a pƌopeƌ apologǇ. “uppose iŶstead that Elǀis͛ kiĐk ǁeƌe Ŷot so ŵuĐh aŶ 
accident as a deliberate opportunistic exploration of what kicking another feels like. Perhaps Elvis is 
                                                          
7
 Foƌ siŵpliĐitǇ, ǁe͛ƌe assuŵiŶg that Aleǆ aĐted aloŶe, i.e. he ǁasŶ͛t goaded oŶ ďǇ aŶǇ of the otheƌs.  
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psychopathic. He might still recognise BeŶ͛s paiŶ ;though Ŷot ǀalue it so highlǇ as Ŷot to kiĐk hiŵͿ aŶd kŶoǁ 
himself to be its agent. But he feels no remorse. We contend that this absence of affective attunement to the 
situation just is his failure to recognise its nature. 
A non-revisionist cognitivist view of apology (i.e. one aiming to uphold both (A) and (B)) thus has to make 
sense of this relation in something like the following terms: it is the suďjeĐt͛s affeĐtiǀe attuŶeŵeŶt that plaĐes 
her in a position to grasp the moral facts germane to apology-making. In being incapable of attuning himself 
affectively in the appropriate way, particular moral facts are blocked off completely from the psychopathic 
suďjeĐt͛s ǀieǁ. AŶd it is ďeĐause he is ďliŶd to ĐeƌtaiŶ ŵoƌal faĐts that the psychopathic subject is unable to 
make certain moral judgements, i.e. those moral judgements that are constitutively involved in apology-
making. Since the dyadic trope sketched out above is intensionally characterised using the affectively-charged 
teƌŵ ͚suffeƌiŶg͛, the grasp of this dyadic trope does seem to consist, at least in part, in an appropriate affective 
attuŶeŵeŶt oŶ the suďjeĐt͛s paƌt. 
The cognitivist picture of apology-making just sketched out thus posits the existence of moral facts the grasp 
of which require affective attunement. To describe what a moral agent grasps—in recognising that he owes 
another person (or party) an apology now—as a moral fact thus requires us, firstly, to acknowledge the 
existence of particular moral facts, in addition to general moral principles. That such facts exist is a claim that 
has long been argued for by moral particularists such as John McDowell and Jonathan Dancy. [4], [10] But even 
if it is accepted that particular moral facts do exist, the very idea that there could exist such facts the grasp of 
which require affective attunement is striking. We are familiar with physical facts, the grasp of which require 
subjects to be appropriately perceptually attuned. What is less familiar but has been discussed by philosophers 
such as McDowell is the idea of logical or mathematical or even moral features of the world, the grasp of 
which require subjects to be appropriately intellectually or rationally attuned [10]. McDowell likens moral 
features of the world to secondary qualities, though the analogy is contested by Crispin Wright, for example 
[11], [15]). On this picture, there is an essential relation between the moral features which a knowledgeable 
agent is able to recognise and his or her responses to them. But apology seems to suggest a novel twist on 
even this picture. We have already suggested that when a subject is sincerely apologetic, it seems right to 
describe the subject as recognising that an apology is called for but also that sincerity, generally at least, 
requires a feeling of remorse. On the broadly cognitivist model of these two features we favour, they come 
together in the grasp of a reflexive dyadic trope.
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Summarising the discussion in this section, we may say the following: claim (A) should be acceptable to both 
cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of moral understanding alike. So, in virtue of his inability to feel 
remorse, the psychopathic subject suffers a serious impairment in moral understanding according to both of 
these two conceptions of moral understanding. But in addition to claim (A), the cognitivist endorses claim (B), 
and the latter claim helps shed light on certain further aspects of apology making (i.e. its inferential import, 
                                                          
8This conclusion, i.e. that affective attunement is integral to moral understanding, might concern the cognitivist 
who wishes to hold that affective attunement is wholly irrelevant to moral understanding. An austere Kantian 
might be motivated to uphold this claim, but it seems to us that a Kantian of this sort is faced with a choice 
between two options, neither of which seems obviously palatable. On the one hand, the Kantian could accept 
that we have a moral duty to make apologies when called for, and then try to block the necessity of affective 
attunement for moral understanding by denying that the feeling of remorse is essential to apology making. The 
difficulty with this option is that it requires us to adopt a revisionary stance towards the concept of apology 
making, i.e. of what we mean by an apology.  
 
In order to avoid this difficulty, the austere Kantian might instead opt to deny that any moral duty attaches to 
apology making — so that it doesn't matter for our capacity for moral understanding that apology making 
requires the feeling of remorse essentially. But this claim does not seem palatable either because a subject‟s 
resistance towards making an apology when called for, in a particular instance, surely cannot be generalised into 
a universal law. A moral practice in which this resistance is generalisable would look very alien to us. Now this 
in itself may not be fatal to the austere Kantian‟s position, since how things appear to us may not be the final 
arbiter in determining what the moral law is. However, if the austere Kantian does proceed along this path, he 
owes us an account of how no specifically moral duty attaches to apology making (i.e. he needs to demonstrate 
that the practice of apology making forms merely a part of social niceties or pragmatics, and thus carries with it 
no moral duty or obligation).  
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but especially its recognitional demands), which turn out to be helpful in suggesting where the source of the 
failure of moral understanding manifest in psychopathy may lie. 
 
III. Conclusion 
We have argued that the convergence in patterns of judgement between the normal population and the 
psychopathic population, in response to trolley problems, tells us nothing very much about the capacity for 
moral judgement in psychopathy; but that the psychopathic subject͛s iŶaďilitǇ to feel remorse does provide us 
with grounds for holding that the capacity for moral understanding is seriously impaired in psychopathy. The 
latter claim rests on the connection between the ability to feel remorse, which is essential to apology-making, 
and apology-making as manifesting the capacity for moral understanding. The purpose of Section III of this 
paper has been to suggest two ways of spelling out this connection—as constrained by the two main 
conceptions of moral understanding—therein rendering intelligible the importance that we pre-theoretically 
plaĐe oŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s aďilitǇ to ŵake apologies iŶ asĐeƌtaiŶiŶg his capacity for moral understanding. If this 
measure of moral understanding is well grounded, it follows that we ought to conclude from the psychopathic 
suďjeĐt͛s inability to feel remorse that his failing is not simply one of motivation, but of understanding. The 
psychopathic subject doesŶ͛t siŵplǇ fail to ďe ŵotiǀated to aĐt ŵoƌallǇ, having grasped how he ought to act; 
more fundamentally, his capacity for moral understanding is seriously impaired. 
The discussion in Section III underscores one further difficulty about the argument from convergence which we 
criticised in Section II, a difficulty which we shall formulate in cognitivist terms. According to the cognitivist 
characterisation of apology making proposed in Section III, the psychopathiĐ suďjeĐt͛s moral understanding is 
impaired because he fails to grasp particular moral facts. This draws attention to the fact that mere 
convergence in judgement doesn't tell us anything about why the convergence happens, and in particular 
about whether the convergence occurs because of anything to do with the moral sensibilities of subjects in the 
two populations (the normal population and the clinical population). If we are right about what follows from 
the inability to feel remorse, then the psychopathic subject does not see what ordinary moral subjects see, in 
the two trolley situations. The ordinary moral subject may see certain features of the second trolley situation 
(the 'personal harm' situation) which causes her to feel revulsion at the very idea of pushing someone directly 
into the path of the trolley (say); whereas perhaps for the psychopathic subject, the difference between 
pulling a switch and pushing someone over is simply a matter of effort: it takes more effort to push someone 
over (which is why he judges that he wouldn't push the person over) than it does to pull a switch (which is why 
he judges that the right thing to do would be to pull the switch). In short, while the pattern of judgement 
displayed by most normal subjects may be determined by those suďjeĐts͛ ŵoƌal seŶsiďilities, the ǀeƌǇ saŵe 
pattern displayed by a psychopathic subject ŵight iŶ faĐt ďe deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs that aƌeŶ͛t 
specifically moral (i.e. considerations of expediency). Mere convergence in judgement alone leaves open this 
possibility, and the discussion in Section III gives us reason to suspect that there are indeed disparate reasons 
why the subjects in the two populations make the judgements that they do. Thus, from convergence alone, we 
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 Because psychopathic subjects are noted for their selfishness, it would be of interest to the empirical 
investigation to introduce a selfish motive into the trolley problem, and then to see if there would still be a 
convergence in judgement especially in the „impersonal harm‟ case. Suppose we added to this version of the 
problem the following detail: “Pulling the switch and derailing the trolley so that it only hits one person (rather 
than five) will entail severe delays to the train you are waiting for, because that single person is standing close to 
the platform that your train is due to arrive at. This will mean that you will miss most of the film you were 
travelling to see.” With this detail added, it would be interesting to find out whether the psychopathic subject 
would still say that he would pull the switch. 
10
 A general observation about the experimental paradigm as a whole: we should be wary of findings about 
psychopathy made on the basis of interviewing psychopathic subjects about hypothetical scenarios since 
psychopathic subjects are known not to be especially concerned about speaking truthfully. They are also known 
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